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We explore the stabilizing effects of unemployment insurance in Chile. A dynamic general 
equilibrium model is calibrated for the Chilean economy for the 1960-2000 period. We assume that 
the economy is subject to exogenous technological shocks and that a fraction of the population is 
liquidity constrained. Our main conclusion is that unemployment insurance has some stabilizing 
effect on the business cycle, especially on consumption, but that this effect is of the second order of 
magnitude. We also find that the larger the fraction of the population that is liquidity constrained, 
the more likely the program is welfare improving. Our results suggest that the objective of 
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1. Introduction 
 
  In October 2002 an unemployment insurance fund was introduced in Chile with the 
stated aim of protecting workers’ income levels when they become unemployed. This paper 
considers the potentially unintended business cycle effects of unemployment insurance, in 
particular the question of whether this insurance has stabilizing effects in terms of making 
the business cycle less pronounced.  
Stabilizing effects ensue if liquidity constrained agents are allowed access to 
unemployment insurance funds when they become unemployed in a recession, allowing 
them to reduce their consumption by less than they would have done if there were no 
unemployment insurance system. As contributions to the fund are larger in booms than in 
recessions, this potentially provides an additional stabilizing effect. We assume non-
diversifiable aggregate technological shocks that produce fluctuations in variables such as 
production, employment and consumption. People are assumed to be liquidity constrained 
and they do not have perfect access to the capital market. 
  The benefits of reducing business fluctuation have been widely studied in the 
literature. Lucas (1987) voiced doubts as to the value of these benefits, calculating that the 
effects on welfare are minimal. He compared his estimate of the benefits of attenuating the 
volatility of the business cycle with the large welfare benefits that attend economic growth, 
concluding that the profession would do better to focus on growth rather than on 
stabilization policies. 
  In the case of unemployment insurance the literature has focused on the stabilization 
and welfare properties of this insurance when markets are incomplete. Based on a model of 
unemployment insurance Baily (1977) reports results as to how much insurance should be 
provided, and in what form. Hamermesh (1982) makes use of a model to determine whether 
current levels of unemployment insurance (UI) in the US are sufficient to overcome the 
liquidity constraint faced by the unemployed. He finds that a large portion of UI benefits do 
little to stabilize the economy, because people consume them as if they were fully expected, 
reducing their saving behavior when employed. Easley, Kiefer and Possen (1985) use a two 
person, two period general equilibrium model with uncertain productivity in the second   2
period. As agents cannot self insure the introduction of UI implies a potential Pareto 
welfare improvement. They also make use of a theoretical model to compare the welfare 
gains of UI vis à vis a negative income tax. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) study the role 
of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard 
using a quantitative general equilibrium model. They assume that people cannot borrow in 
the capital market and that agents face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks (there 
are no aggregate shocks). They conclude that if there is no moral hazard the optimal 
replacement rate may be as high as 0.65 (similar to that found in the US economy) and that 
the welfare benefits of UI are large. However, if there is moral hazard and the replacement 
rate is not set at the optimal level, the economy can be worse off with UI than it would have 
been without it. 
Imrohoroglu (1989), and Atkenson and Pehlan (1994), argue the unemployed bear  
a disproportionate burden of the cost of employment fluctuations during recessions. Both 
papers focus on the unemployment risk as the main undiversified risk associated with the 
business cycle. Nonetheless, their estimates of the welfare gains of curbing business cycle 
fluctuations are also small
1 because the data shows very little time variation in the average 
duration of US unemployment. Hence, the risk of a long period of unemployment in a 
recession is relatively small. However, Beaudry and Pages (2001) argue that focusing only 
on unemployment duration may underestimate the welfare gains of stabilization policies. 
They conclude that mild variability of aggregate wages may hide important business cycle 
fluctuations in individual wages and that this source of risk implies substantial welfare 
costs. They also conclude that attention to the design of unemployment insurance is 
required if UI is to contribute to diversifying the risk of economic fluctuations. More 
specifically, they find that unconditional UI can be an inefficient way of reducing the cost 
of business fluctuations, while a state contingent UI scheme that offers more generous 
subsidies during recessions than during expansions improves risk sharing and reduces the 
cost of business cycles. Brown and Ferrall (2003) study the interaction of the business 
cycle, unemployment insurance and the labor market for young men in Canada. They argue 
                                                 
1 Imrohoroglu (op.cit.) finds that the welfare cost of aggregate fluctuations is about 0.3% of consumption.   3
that the design of UI is important, proving that in some cases a poorly designed UI scheme 
can exacerbate recessions. 
  The effect of unemployment insurance on the business cycle has not been studied 
for the Chilean economy. In this paper we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to 
study the stabilization properties of the Chilean UI program on the business cycle. 
Specifically we use a real business cycle model with liquidity constrained agents and an 
economy subject to exogenous technological shocks. The model captures the effect of the 
unemployment insurance program on fluctuations of output, consumption, investment, the 
capital stock and employment. It is important to bear in mind that while unemployment 
insurance has the effect of reducing the liquidity constraint for people that are laid off, 
hence reducing the volatility of consumption, the taxes used to finance the program are 
themselves distortionary. We find that in the case of Chile the unemployment insurance 
program marginally attenuates business cycle fluctuations. Whether the program is welfare 
improving is found to depend on the fraction of the population with liquidity constraints 
and the size of the insurance payments. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the unemployment 
insurance program in Chile. Section 3 presents the model and section 4 its calibration and 
simulation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment insurance in Chile 
The unemployment insurance fund in Chile is financed from three sources: workers, 
employers and the state. Workers contribute 0.6% of their gross income every month, 
which is deposited directly in their individual accounts. The employer contributes 2.4% of 
each employee’s income, with two thirds of this going to the individual’s account, and the 
remainder going to a ‘solidarity fund’. The third source of funding is a yearly fiscal 
contribution of US$15 million to the solidarity fund, a contribution that can be adjusted 
yearly. 
Every worker that voluntarily leaves his job, or is fired for a reason attributable to 
him can access his individual unemployment account. The maximum number of monthly   4
withdrawals that this worker can make from his account is equal to the number of years that 
he has been contributing to the unemployment insurance, up to a maximum of five. The 
amount of the withdrawal falls every month, following a formula stipulated in the law
2 that 
created the scheme. 
It the person is fired for reasons attributable to the firm, in addition to his individual 
account he also has access to the solidarity fund. However, to be eligible for this he must 
also fulfill several conditions: first, the individual must have contributed to his 
unemployment insurance account for at least 12 consecutive months; second, he must be 
unemployed when he requests this access; and third, his individual account has to be 
insufficient to cover the minimum payments the UI scheme is designed to provide. 
It should be clear that the Chilean UI program bears more resemblance to a 
mandatory saving program than a real insurance program: all working individuals 
contribute, but the unemployed are not automatically entitled to payments, and payments 
are based on individual accounts rather than on the ‘solidarity fund.’ However, this 
distinction makes no difference to our analysis of the stabilization properties of the Chilean 
program.  
 
3. The model 
3.1. Household and firms 
  Households in this economy maximize the expected value of their utility function 
from t = 0 to infinity. We assume that the utility function is separable between consumption 
and leisure, and that for individual i in time t it can be represented by: 
 





i n v c u U − =        ( 1 )  
 
                                                 
2 For instance if he can make five withdrawals he withdraws 25% of his individual account in the first month, 
22.5% in the second, 20% in the third, 17.5%, in the fourth and the remainder in the fifth.   5
c is consumption and n the hours worked. As in Hansen (1985) we assume that labor is 
indivisible: individuals can either work full time, denoted by n, or not at all. β is the 
discount factor.  
  There are two types of individuals: those that have access to the capital market and 
can borrow or save in it to smooth their consumption, made up of a fraction (1-θ) of the 
population, and those that do not have access to the capital market, consuming their income 
each period (a fraction θ of the population).  
  The unemployment insurance consists of an individual account with funds 
amounting to  t Φ , financed with a payroll tax at rate τ. The individual becomes unemployed 
with a probability (1-p), in which case he can withdraw funds from his unemployment 
insurance account
3. Individuals do not know ex-ante whether they are going to be 
unemployed next period. w is the wage per hour and δ the rate of depreciation of the capital 
stock per period. In each period there are four types of individuals: 
a)  The individual is working and has access to the capital market. In this case his 
budget constraint and the time paths of his capital stock and unemployment 
insurance account are: 
 
n w k r i c t t t t t ) 1 ( τ − + = +      ( 2 a )  
t t t i k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ       ( 2 b )  
n wt t t τ + Φ = Φ +1       ( 2 c )  
 
b)  The individual is working and does not have access to the capital market.  
 
n w c t t ) 1 ( τ − =       ( 3 a )  
0 1 = + t k        ( 3 b )  
                                                 
3 In the simulations below we will assume that each period is one year. In the Chilean unemployment 
insurance program one year of contributions is required to be eligible to the unemployment insurance. The 
withdrawal period, however, is less than a year. The implicit assumption is that all accumulated funds are 
exhausted during the year in which the individual is unemployed.     6
n wt t t τ + Φ = Φ +1       ( 3 c )  
 
c)  The individual is not working and has access to the capital market.  
 
t t t t t k r i c Φ + = +       ( 4 a )  
t t t i k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ       ( 4 b )  
0 1 = Φ + t        ( 4 c )  
 
d)  The individual is not working and does not have access to the capital market.  
 
t t c Φ =        ( 5 a )  
0 1 = + t k        ( 5 b )  
0 1 = Φ + t        ( 5 c )  
  As each agent faces an ex-ante lottery as to his employment situation, at each point 
in time the share of the population in any of the four situations described above are shown 
in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 
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The instantaneous expected utility function is: 
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  But the number of hours worked,  t N , is:  n p Nt = . Since (1-p)v(0) is a constant, he 
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  On the other hand, the expected budget constraint and the time paths that emerge 
from the employment lotteries are: 
 
t t t t t t p p n w k r i c Φ − + − + − = − + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( τ θ θ      (8) 
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subject to (8) - (10). 
 
  On the other hand we assume a single firm with technology described by a standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
 
α α − =
1 ) ( ) ( t t t t N k Z Y          ( 1 1 )  
 
k is capital, N is labor and Z represents technology, which is assumed to follow a 
first order Markov process. In particular, Z obeys the following law of motion: 
 
t t t z Z ε ρ + = − ) log( ) log( 1         ( 1 2 )  
 
where ρ is the first order autocorrelation coefficient and  t ε is a random shock with a 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 
2
ε σ . We assume that markets clear, i.e.: 




t t Y i c N N k k = ∆Φ + + = = ; ;  , where the superscript “d” denotes demand.  
 
3.2. Optimality conditions 
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1 + Φ − Φ + = + t t t t t p Y i c         ( 1 7 )  
()() t t t i k k θ θ δ − + − − = + 1 1 ) 1 ( 1        ( 1 8 )  
τ t t t t N w p + Φ = Φ +1         ( 1 9 )  
α α − =
1 ) ( ) ( t t t t N k Z Y         ( 2 0 )  
t t t z Z ε ρ + = − ) log( ) log( 1         ( 2 1 )  
 
  Equation (13)   is the Euler condition for present and future consumption. Equation 
(14) states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal 
to the adjusted wage. Equations (15) and (16) are the usual first order conditions for the 
factor (labor and capital) markets. Equation (17) is the aggregate budget constraint for 
period t. Equations (18) and (19) represent the law of motions for k and Φ. Finally, 
equation (20) is the production function and equation (21) is the technology shock. 
 
4. Calibration and Simulation 
 
4.1 Business Cycle Observations in Chile 
The model is calibrated to reproduce the stylized facts of the Chilean economy.  We 
use Chilean national account statistics from 1960 to 2000 reported yearly, obtained from 
Diaz, Luders, and Wagner (2005). Table 2 reports several statistics of interest calculated 
from annual data. All the variables are measured in natural logarithms. To calculate the 
standard deviations, we de-trended the series using the HP filter. 
The data show significant volatility that decreases over time. The period from 1986 
to 2000 is less volatile in almost all the variables included in the table. These data show 
more volatility than those reported by Bergoing and Soto (2005) for Chile for the latter 
period. In their case, output and consumption have standard deviations of approximately 
2.2 percent, while investment has a standard deviation of 7.47.
4  On the other hand, our 
                                                 
4 Our measure of volatility differs from Bergoing and Soto (2005) because we use the HP filter while 
Bergoing and Soto do not.   10
results are less volatile than those reported in Carmichael, Kéita and Samson (1999) for a 




Business Cycle Statistics: standard deviations of Real GDP, Investment, 
Consumption, Labor. (%) 
  σY  σL  σC  σI  σK  σY/L 
1960-2000  5.84 3.60 8.18 14.60  1.57 4.21 
       
1960-1980  6.27 3.00 9.39 13.35  1.28 4.42 
1980-2000  5.93 4.24 7.09 17.04  1.79 4.26 
1986-2000  3.94 2.64 4.79 11.65  1.91 3.76 
       
The variables are the natural logarithms of GDP (Y), consumption (C), gross fixed investment 
expenditure (I), capital stock (K), and output per capita (Y/L).  The variables are de-trended by 




The standard deviations reported here are also larger than those reported for 
developed economies (see Hansen, op.cit.). However, there are some similarities with 
developed economies. First, the volatility of the real capital stock is much lower than the 
volatility of real output, while investment volatility is about three times that of real output. 
Second, consumption volatility is slightly higher than the volatility of real output. Third, 
employment volatility is lower than that of real output. 
 
4.2 Simulation method 
  The model can be solved numerically by computing the competitive equilibrium and 
representing it in a recursive form. In that case, the firm and household problems should be 
solved separately, conditional on a conjectured pricing function. If the conjectured pricing   11
function is correct, we should observe no disequilibrium between the supply and demand 
obtained from the household and firm problems. On the other hand, if the conjectured 
pricing function is incorrect, there should be a disequilibrium which is corrected by 
changing the conjectured pricing function. In this procedure, we iterate on this algorithm 
until no disequilibrium exists.
5 The problem with this method is that convergence can be 
slow and may not be obtained as there is no guarantee of a contraction mapping. Hence, we 
follow an alternative procedure, which will now be explained.  
Following Mendoza (2004), we decided to solve a quasi-social planner problem. As 
we face an economy with distortionary taxes, the social planner’s solution may not coincide 
with the competitive equilibrium solution.  In fact, we know from the optimality conditions 











t 1 , where  t µ is the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with the UI restriction and  t λ  is the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the individual’s budget constraint. Therefore, when  t µ  is approximately 
equal to t λ , the distortion is negligible and the social planner’s solution coincides with that 
of competitive equilibrium. This ratio can be obtained from our computations,
6 which 
implies that computing the quasi social planner solution can be as good as solving for 
competitive equilibrium through the iteration procedure described above. This is the 
procedure we follow here. 
  To solve the quasi-social planner problem, we write the individual’s problem 
including the firm’s optimality and the market clearing conditions in the following single 
dynamic programming equation: 
 
                                                 
5 See Judd (1998), and Mendoza and Smith (2003). 





is approximately equal to 0.9.   12
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where ) , , ( t t t z k v Φ  is the value function,  ) , , ( t t t z k Φ are the state variables, and  ) , , ( t t t N i c  
are the decision variables. The solution method for this dynamic programming equation is 
the standard linear-quadratic methodology (Cooley and Prescott, 1995) used in the real 
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and we define the return function of the problem as 
() ( ) t t t t t t t t t t t t N i p N k z u i N k z r 0
1 ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ( , , , , α α θ α τ
α α − − Φ − + − − − − ≡ Φ
− . We then 
approximate the return function by a second order Taylor expansion: 
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Hessian of the function  () t t t t t i N k z r , , , , Φ  evaluated at the steady state. Using this 
quadratic approximation, in addition to approximating the evolution of unemployment   13
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22 = . Finally, to solve the problem, we guess a quadratic value function, and solve 
it using successive iterations of the Ricatti equation (see Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2001). 
 
4.3 Calibration of the parameters  
We assume that δ (the rate of depreciation of the capital stock) is 5.3%, as estimated by 
the Ministry of Finance.
7 The discount factor β is assumed to be 0.99. The share of capital 
in production (α) is set at 0.4. We estimated the production function residual using Chilean 
data from 1960 to 2000 by: 
 
) log( ) 1 ( ) log( ) log( ) log( t t t t N k Y Z α α − − − =  
 
The first-order autocorrelation coefficient for  t Z is 0.95, indicating high serial correlation in 
this series. Hence we used this value for the parameter ρ. The standard deviation of the 
                                                 
7 Ministry of Finance (2005).   14





4.4 Simulation Results 
  In the simulations, we use different values of θ and we compute our statistics using 
2,000 simulations, in which each simulation was done by drawing a technological shock 
from the normal distribution specified above. Each simulation has 45 periods. Table 3 
presents the simulation results obtained from our model when θ = 10% (i.e. 10% of the 
population is excluded from the capital market). 
  The results in Table 3 show that in absence of an unemployment insurance (UI) 
scheme the volatility of output is similar to the volatility observed in the data. Investment is 
more volatile while the capital stock is less volatile than output. However, consumption and 
labor are less volatile in the model than they are in the actual statistics for the Chilean 
economy.  
To focus on analyzing the impact of introducing UI, it is instructive to compare the 
results in the first row of the table with the results in the other rows. The table shows that as 
we increase the tax rate (ie. the size of the UI program), volatility decreases, especially in 
the case of consumption. However, this effect is less clear in the case of output and 
investment. In fact, the volatility of these variables shows a marked fall only when the tax 
rate is greater than 3 percent. A related result is that as we increase the tax rate, the steady 
state consumption level decreases due to the distortions such an increase introduces into the 
labor supply decision. There are thus two effects of increasing the tax rate which have 
opposing effects on individuals’ welfare: (1) consumption volatility falls, but at the cost of 
(2) lowering the steady state level of consumption. As shown in the table, the overall 
impact is a fall in individual welfare.  It should be noted that this last result depends on the 
                                                 
8 According to the Ministry of Finance (op.cit.) the natural unemployment rate in Chile is close to 8%, which 
would imply a p of 0.92.   15
specification of the utility function, which in this case is linear in labor but logarithmic in 
consumption.   
Table 4 shows the results of a similar exercise, but for the case in which θ (the 
fraction of individuals with no access to capital markets) increases to 20% of the 
population. In the absence of UI, the results are similar to those reported in Table 2, but 
both consumption and the capital stock become more volatile, while investment volatility 
falls. It is of interest to note that as we increase the size of the unemployment insurance 
program, the variables become less volatile than they were when θ was 10%. Furthermore, 
even though the steady state level of consumption decreases, total welfare initially rises as 
the impact on volatility is larger. The initial positive impact on welfare later becomes 
negative as the distortions imposed on steady state consumption become larger.  
From these results we conclude that in economies with a larger fraction of 
population with no access to the capital market, an unemployment insurance scheme can be 
welfare improving as the distortionary effect of the tax used to finance the UI scheme is 
more than compensated by the benefits of reducing the liquidity constraint. As the 
unemployment insurance program becomes larger, i.e. the tax rate increases, the 
distortionary effect dominates and welfare decreases.   16
Table 3: Simulation results for various tax rates 
(θ=0.1 and 2000 simulations) 































































































The variables are the natural logarithms of GDP (Y), consumption (C), gross fixed investment 
expenditure (I), capital stock (K), and output per capita (Y/L).  The variables are de-trended by 
using the HP filter using a smoothing parameter equal to 100. The notation σ(i) indicates standard 
deviation. The standard deviations of the estimates appear in parentheses.  
 
   17
Table 4: Simulation results for several tax rates 
(θ=0.2 and 2000 simulations) 































































































The variables are the natural logarithms of GDP (Y), consumption (C), gross fixed investment 
expenditure (I), capital stock (K), and output per capita (Y/L).  The variables are de-trended by 
using the HP filter using a smoothing parameter equal to 100. The notation σ(i) indicates standard 
deviation. The standard deviations of the estimates appear in parentheses.  
 
 
4.5 Impulse response functions 
We now consider the dynamics of the model in two cases: (1) the absence of 
unemployment insurance and (2) a 3% tax on labor income to provide for unemployment 
insurance. To do so, we examine the impulse-response functions of our variables of interest 
when a negative 1% technological shock occurs.  
Figures 1 to 6 plot the response of consumption, investment, capital stock, hours of 
work, unemployment insurance and GDP. The variables experience the negative effects of   18
the technological shock as can be seen in the figures. However, what emerges from these 
figures is that the variables’ time paths do not differ significantly in the presence or absence 
of unemployment insurance: some smoothing is observed when there is unemployment 
insurance, but the difference between the two cases is small.  
To conclude, the impulse response functions indicate that although introducing UI 




  This paper studies the effects of unemployment insurance on the business cycle. We 
consider whether the unemployment insurance program that was introduced in Chile in 
October 2002 has had stabilizing effects on the business cycle, simulating the presence of 
this insurance over the 1960-2000 period. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model à la 
Hansen (1985), where the economy is subject to exogenous technological shocks which 
produce fluctuations in output, investment, consumption and employment. The model also 
has a fraction of the population that is liquidity constrained: individuals who do not have 
access to the capital market and hence cannot save, forcing them to consume their income, 
thus making their consumption more volatile. Such individuals cannot replicate the 
unemployment insurance program in the capital market, which makes this program 
potentially welfare improving. 
  Our results show that unemployment insurance reduces the volatility of the 
macroeconomic variables under consideration, especially the volatility of consumption. 
However, the effect is rather small. We conclude that the most appropriate justification for 
the current unemployment insurance program in Chile is that advanced when it was 
created: that it improves the welfare of the poor when they are unemployed. The possible 
additional justification explored in this paper – the stabilization of the business cycle – does 
not seem to be large enough to be considered an important achievement of the program.  
  We also conclude that the larger the population with liquidity constraints the more 
likely that the unemployment insurance program is welfare improving. This is because on   19
the one hand the program loosens the constraint for those that are liquidity constrained, but 
on the other it is funded via distortionary taxation. The larger the fraction of the population 
that is liquidity constrained,  the more important the welfare improving first effect. We also 
find that as the tax rate increases, the distortionary effect becomes more significant and the 
likelihood that the program will reduce welfare rises. 
  A final consideration relates to the potential instruments that an economy like Chile, 
which faces large exogenous shocks, has at hand for stabilizing the business cycle. This 
paper suggests that the unemployment insurance is not an efficient way of attaining this 
goal. Although not the topic of this paper, it is likely that policies such as Chile’s current 
fiscal structural balance
9, or a price-smoothing fund for the commodities it produces
10 are 
more efficient means of smoothing the business cycle. 
                                                 
9 Where the government saves in above-trend-growth periods and dissaves in recessions (see Marcel, et. al, 
2000). 
10 Such as the current copper compensation fund.   20
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